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Abstract
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of these works are created within the course of employment. Under the present law, copyright in these
employment creations vest in employers. This paper examines employer and employee rights in relation to
copyright works and possible alternatives to the current scheme. The author then concludes as to whether
employers or employees should own copyright in works created in the course of employment.
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OWNERSHIP OF EMPLOYMENT
CREATIONS
BY LESLEY E. HARRIS*
Copyright is in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work, and
mechanical contrivance. Many of these works are created within the course of
employment. Under the present law, copyright in these employment creations
vest in employers. This paper examines employer and employee rights in rela-
tion to copyright works and possible alternatives to the current scheme. The
author then concludes as to whether employers or employees should own copy-
right in works created in the course of employment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The present Canadian Copyright Act was written in 1921.1 Due to
a rapidly changing society and technology not contemplated at that
time, the Act is extremely outdated and in need of revision. There have
been several efforts made over the past thirty years to change the Act,
which resulted in many reports containing recommendations. The rec-
ommendations usually refer to the issue of ownership of works made
within an employment context.
The Ilsley Commission, a Royal Commission which reported in
1957,2 as well as a later study by A.A. Keyes and C. Brunet on behalf
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in 1977,3 recommended employer
ownership where works are created during the course of employment.
Legislation in both the United States and the United Kingdom provide
for employer ownership. In May of 1984 the Liberal government re-
leased From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on Copyright4
© Copyright, 1986, Lesley E. Harris.
* LL.B. 1985, Osgoode Hall Law School. Lesley E. Harris is currently a student-at-law at
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I Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Note that this Act has been in force since 1924.
2 Can., Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Industrial Designs: Re-
port on Copyright (Isley Commission) (1957).
A.A. Keyes & C. Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law
(1977).
" Can., From Gutenberg to Telidon A White Paper on Copyright (1984) [hereinafter White
Paper]. Note also that Keyes said that ownership of copyright material produced in the course of
employment is a "green area" and "input in called for": Meeting of Board of Governors of the
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which surprisingly took no stand at all on ownership of employment
creations, but rather asked for public comment upon the matter. Before
such comments were received, the Conservative party came into power
and the status given to the White Paper was that of a document not
necessarily embodying government policy. On January 24, 1985, the
then current government conferred all issues of copyright revision to
the Standing Committee on Communications and Culture. The Com-
mittee then established and delegated the appropriate powers to the all-
party Sub-Committee which received almost 300 written responses and
heard 111 representations from interested parties. Conclusions of their
findings were compiled in the Charter of Rights for Creators5 which
was published in October 1985. The Sub-Committee's report basically
follows in the footsteps of the earlier recommendations with respect to
ownership of employment creations.
This paper, the idea for which was conceived when there were no
recommendations for ownership of employment creations, will present a
thorough examination of employer and employee rights in relation to
copyright works and of possible alternatives to the current scheme. The
author will then conclude whether employers or employees should own
the copyright in works created in the course of employment.
6
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
The problem of ownership of employment creations arises when X,
an employer, hires Y, an employee, to create a certain work within the
course of employment. Both claim that they are entitled to the work:
X, because he has paid to have the work created, supplied the materials
and environment and often the idea; Y, because he has created the
work. In fact, each might have a valid claim since Y has created two
different works to which rights may attach:
(i) the tangible res, the actual words or pictures on a particular
piece of paper, and
(ii) the copyright in the words or pictures, for example, the right to
exploit their form irrespective of the destiny of their tangible
content.7
Canadian Copyright Institute with Messrs. Couchman and Keyes (July 1i, 1984).
Report of the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright, Standing Committee on Com-
munications and Culture, October 1985. [hereinafter the Sub-Committee Report].
' Note that this paper only examines the issues relating to works made in the course of
employment and does not explore the area of commissioned works, except where such later works
are encompassed by the term "works made in the course of employment."
Dr. J. Phillips, "The Employee as Author and Owner of Literary Copyright - Some Theo-
retical Reflections" (1979) EIPR 274 at 274.
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The ownership of the tangible res is determined by areas of the law
such as labour or contract; it will, therefore, not be discussed in this
paper. The rights beyond the tangible res, that is, those attaching to
the form of the idea though not to the idea itself, constitute incorporeal
property which copyright may protect. It is the ownership of this prop-
erty and not of the physical work which this paper will address; should
ownership of a copyright work created in the course of employment
attach to an employer or to an employee?
The type of rights which may attach to an employer under Cana-
dian copyright law are known as economic or pecuniary rights. These
are rights which enable the copyright owner to earn money. Economic
or pecuniary rights attach to the works protected by copyright; these
include every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work,8
and mechanical contrivance. 9 The owner has the right to reproduce,
perform in public, publish, adapt or broadcast these works, or authorize
the same.' 0 The duration of copyright in a work is generally based upon
the life of the author". The term of copyright is for the life of the
author plus fifty years.' 2 Since copyright can be assigned, an employer
or a person other than the creator of the work, may have ownership in
it. The term of copyright, however, will still be determined according to
the life of the author and not by the life of the copyright owner.
Independent of these economic rights, and even after assignment
of copyright, an author has the right to protect his reputation. He has
the right to claim authorship which is called the right of paternity, and
the right to restrain any distortion, mutilation or other modification of
his work that would be prejudicial to his reputation, which is called the
right of integrity. 13 These are known as the moral rights. Unless they
have been waived, these rights will be retained by the employee/crea-
tor, even where the employer is entitled to all of the pecuniary rights.' 4
In other words, moral rights are non-assignable.
8 Copyright Act, s.4.
9 R.S.C. c. C-30; C. 10 (2nd Supp) s. 65 [1970-71-72, c.60], s. 1 which repeals and replaces
s. 4(3) of the Act.
'0 Copyright Act, s. 3.
11 The terms "author", "creator" and "artist" are used interchangeably in this paper.
12 Copyright Act, s.5. Note that this term applies "except as otherwise expressly provided"
by the Act.
13 Copyright Act, s.12(7).
The Copyright Act does not explicitly state the duration of moral rights. It is questionable
whether moral rights pass to heirs since they protect an author's personal reputation which argua-
bly ends with the author's death. Recent recommendations, however, favour a term of protection
equal to that given to pecuniary rights: White Paper, supra note 4 at 58; Sub-Committee's Re-
port, supra note 5 at 6 & 8, recommendation 4.
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III. OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT IN CANADA
In Canada, the author of a work is generally the first owner of the
copyright therein.15 This rule is subject to other provisions in the Act,
including the one for employment creations.
Where the author is in the employment of another person under a
contract of service or apprenticeship and the work is made in the
course of his employment, the employer, in the absence of any agree-
ment to the contrary, is the first owner of the copyright. 16 It is thought
that employers retain copyright in works created by their employees as
a reasonable return for their risks from the monetary investment in
that work. In addition, employers furnish the opportunities for creative
works to be made which might not otherwise exist. They also organize
the production of the material and arrange for the distribution and
marketing of the finished product.
The Copyright Act affords journalists a special status as compared
to other employees since the nature of their job is the exclusive creation
of copyright works. Other employees might only create works inciden-
tally to their other duties.1  Where the work is an article or other con-
tribution to a newspaper, magazine, or similar periodical, the author, in
the absence of any agreement to the contrary, is deemed to have a right
to restrain the printing of the work outside of these publications.18
Despite the designation in the Act of the author as the first owner
of copyright in his work, there is no definition of author in the Act
(except with respect to photographs 9 and sound recordings 20). Since
copyright does not protect an idea, but merely the expression of an
idea, it is clear that an author is not a person who merely suggests an
idea. It has been held that a secretary to whom a story is dictated is
not an author,21 whereas a person who writes down the "words" from a
seance may be an author for copyright purposes. 2 Generally, the au-
thor is the person who puts the ideas into a form which the public may
appreciate.23
Copyright Act, s.12(1).
16 Copyright Act, s. 12(3).
17 For example, although it may not be a secretary's duty to create copyright works, copy-
right works such as memos or letters may be created incidentally to a secretary's duties. See infra
notes 60-65, and accompanying text.
:8 Copyright Act, s.12(3).
19 Copyright Act, s.9.
20 Copyright Act, s.10.
21 Walter v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539.
22 Cummins v. Bond (1927), 1 Ch. 167.
21 Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd. (1938), 1 Ch. 106. This definition of author is consis-
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Under limited circumstances a corporation may be defined as an
author. A corporation may be the author of a photograph, mechanical
contrivance or cinematographic work.24 Otherwise, a body corporate
may not be an author within the meaning of the Copyright Act, though
it may be the owner of copyright. Incorporated companies may acquire
title to the copyright in a work by assignment from the author or by
one of the ways mentioned in sub-sections 12(2) or (3) of the Copy-
right Act. 25 When corporations acquire title to a work, akin to an em-
ployer owning copyright in his employee's work, the term of copyright
is based on the life of the author and the author retains the moral
rights unless they have been waived. Note that where the author of a
work is the first owner of the copyright therein and the author assigns
that copyright, there is a statutory reversion of the copyright to the
author's estate twenty-five years after his death.
26
There are many problems in the present law regarding ownership
of employment creations. The first difficulty with the present employer
ownership provision is the ambiguous language used to determine
whether the section is applicable to certain situations. The unclear
phrases are "contract of service" and works made in the "course of
employment." "The meaning of the words 'contract of service' has been
considered on several occasions and it has been difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to frame a satisfactory definition for them. '27 No established rules
exist for determining whether a work was created by an employee
tent with the requirement in s.3 of the Act which provides that protection is only granted to those
works which are in "some material form." Besides this fixation requirement, there are other gen-
eral qualifications for entitlement to copyright protection such as originality and place of publica-
tion. With respect to the author, it is necessary that he be a Canadian or British subject, or a
resident in any of Her Majesty's Dominions, or a citizen of any other country adhering to the
Berne Convention for copyright protection, or a citizen of a country with which Canada has some
reciprocal agreement: Copyright Act s.4. Citizens of countries adhering to the U.C.C. are also
protected: s.4(2) of the Copyright Act permits the Minister to extend the Act to other conventions
(such as the Universal Copyright Convention).
24 Copyright Act, ss.9 and 10. Where a corporation is an author for copyright purposes, the
duration of copyright is 50 years from the making of the negative of the plate from which the
work was derived. Under the present Act it is unclear whether corporate authors receive moral
rights. However, the White Paper and the Sub-Committee Report both recommend that moral
rights be accorded to a corporate author: White Paper, supra note 4 at 33; Sub-Committee Re-
port, supra note 5 at 13 & recommendation 14.
25 Massie & Renwick v. Underwriters' Survey Bureau Ltd., [1940] S.C.R. 218. Note that
s. 12(2) grants copyright, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, to the commissioner of
an engraving, photograph or portrait.
28 Copyright Act, s. 12(5). The White Paper, supra note 4 at 52, recommends its repeal.
27 University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at
610 per. Peterson J. Note however that the Sub-Committee believes that the distinction between a
"contract for services" and a "contract of service" is appropriate in the law of copyright and
should continue, but that a new Act should define the word "employee": Sub-Committee Report,
supra note 5 at 14 & recommendation 16.
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under a "contract of service" in the "course of employment" so each
case is determinative upon its facts. As a result, an employer can never
be certain whether he owns a particular work which he has paid some-
one to create without a court determination or an express contract to
that effect.
In ascertaining whether an author is under a contract of service,
the cases usually differentiate between a "contract of service" and a
"contract for services." Many different tests for contract of service
have developed in various areas of the law such as contract and tort,
but few have been suggested in the context of copyright law. Some of
the older cases, decided under the Workers' Compensation Acts,
stressed that the greater the control the employer had over an em-
ployee, the more probable it was that the employee was under a con-
tract of service.28 Control was later held to be important under the
United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911.21
Recently, cases have been departing from the "control" test. This
departure may be due to a reluctance by the courts to explore areas of
law other than copyright to interpret "contract of service." Different
underlying policy considerations may exist in a context other than
copyright which may result in an interpretation of "contract of service"
inapplicable to copyright. In addition, the control test may not be ap-
propriate for all copyright matters, especially those situations involving
skilful or creative employees. In the case of a writer or artist it is al-
most impossible to establish the amount of control an employer has
over the creation.
Stephenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd. v. MacDonald and Evans
illustrates a newer approach.30 Lord Justice Denning states in this case
that the commonly used control test is not universally correct. He then
comments that:
[o]ne feature which seems to run through the instances is that, under a contract
of service, a man is employed as part of the business, and his work is done as an
integral part of the business; whereas, under a contract for services, his work,
although done for the business, is not integrated into it but is only accessory to
it.s 1
While concurring with Lord Justice Denning on all the issues, Sir
28 For example, Simmons v. Heath Laundry Co., [1910] 1 K.B. 543 applied the "control"
test with respect to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906.
29 1-2 Geo. V., c. 45. In University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd.,
supra note 27, it was held that the independence of the employee is the key factor in determining
whether a person is under a "contract of service" or a "contract for services."
20 (1952), 1 T.L.R. 101.
21 Ibid. at 111.
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Raymond Evershed nonetheless dwells on the control test. Therefore
the control test has not yet been discarded despite the enunciation of a
new approach by Lord Justice Denning.
The "integral part of the business" test as stated by Lord Justice
Denning continued to be applied in later cases, and it is now the test
used in copyright cases to determine whether an author is an employee
and under a "contract of service."
32
Under the requirements of the Act, proof that an employee is
under a contract of service is essential but not sufficient for copyright
to vest in his employer. The work must also be made "in the course of
employment." This is often difficult to ascertain since the extent of em-
ployment is not always explicit and the hours of employment not al-
ways specified. Whether a work is made "in the course of employment"
also depends upon the facts of each case.
In Byrne v. Statist Co.,33 decided under the United Kingdom
Copyright Act 1911, an employee on the editorial staff of a newspaper,
employed by the proprietors to translate and summarize a speech for
extra remuneration over his regular salary, was held to have copyright
in his translation. The translation was undertaken during the author's
own time and not as part of his employment duties under his contract
of service.
Stephenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd. v. MacDonald and Evans"4
also decided under the Copyright Act 1911, held that an accountant
owned copyright in lectures he wrote dealing with the business where
he worked. The lectures were written for delivery to universities and to
scholastic and professional societies, and were not prepared in the
course of the accountant's employment.
Problems of determination may also arise with respect to a doctor
on staff at a hospital or a nurse on staff at a school, who is employed as
part of a contract of service to lecture to students. If, for his own con-
venience, the speaker puts the lectures into writing, the copyright in the
written work belongs to him; writing down the lectures is not really
part of his contract of service, even though it may be useful to him.
35
Each case must be examined on its facts according to the uncer-
tain common law tests to decide whether the author was under a "con-
tract of service" and whether the work in issue was done within the
11 Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd., [1973] R.P.C. 765.
33 (1914) 1 K.B. 622.
3' Supra note 30.
35 Ibid. at 111.
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"course of employment."3 6
The necessity of a factual determination by the courts to establish
ownership can have a profound effect on an employer. First, an em-
ployer may be sued by an employee for infringement of the employee's
copyright. Second, unless an employer has obtained an assignment
from the employee or is willing to take the risk that he owns the copy-
right in that work, he may be involved in two law suits in order to
protect "his" copyright against infringement: first with the employee,
then with the alleged infringer. The process of a preliminary trial to
resolve employer ownership of a work may be time-consuming, aggra-
vating and expensive. If the employer is unsuccessful in his initial ac-
tion against the employee, he will lack the standing to sue the alleged
infringer. If the employer is successful in proving that he is the owner
of the copyright, he will then be able to proceed in an action against
the alleged infringer of his copyright. By this time such an action may
be frustrated by further actions of the infringer or by the expiration of
the statutory limitation period. 7
A second problem arising out of the ambiguous wording of the Act
relates to the special regime enjoyed by journalists. The Act stipulates
that an employer of a journalist is granted copyright in the journalist's
work if the requirements of employer ownership are met. This right is
limited to the publication of the work in a "newspaper, magazine or
similar periodical." These expressions, however, are not defined in the
Act. Since these publications are characterized by their recurring for-
mat, it is doubtful whether a single issue journal would be categorized
within this context.38
These expressions also appear to allow an employer to publish an
article ordered for periodical X in periodical Y, as long as Y is similar
to X. Keyes and Brunet suggest that the intent of the law is to restrain
publication other than in the periodical originally envisioned by the au-
thor and recommend that the Act give the author a right to prevent
such use.3 9
A further problem with the journalist provision is the policy under-
s6 Note that an engraving, photograph or portrait ordered for valuable consideration is never
one made under a "contract of service" and is covered by s.12(2). The White Paper recommends
the abolishment of this section, supra note 4 at 31; Sub-Committe Report, supra note 5 at 14 &
recommendation 17.
37 Copyright Act, s.24 provides that a civil action for infringement of copyright must be
commenced within three years after the infringement.
38 E.E. Skone James & E.P. Skone James, Copinger & Skone on Copyright, 10th ed. (1965)
at 251.
39 Supra note 3 at 71.
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lying it. It is hard to justify this section on the rationale that journalist
employees are paid solely to create while other employees create copy-
right works incidentally to their other duties. Commercial artists and
screenwriters may also be employed to create copyright works, yet they
have no special right to restrain certain uses of their works.
A third issue is the extent of rights that an employer has in an
employee's work. An employer who owns copyright in the work not
only has the right to reproduce the work but also possesses the subsidi-
ary rights as set out in section 3 in the Copyright Act, such as transla-
tion, film and dramatic rights. These rights are not limited to the dura-
tion of employment but continue to exist after employment has
terminated and for a period of fifty years after the employee's death.
An opportunity thus exists for an employer to benefit from a work in a
variety of ways over a substantial period of time. This exploitation is
subject only to an altered form of the work not prejudicing the em-
ployee's rights, provided that the employee has not waived his moral
rights. Even if an employee has retained his moral rights, it is ex-
tremely difficult to prove that any alterations have prejudiced his hon-
our or reputation, and the only remedy is an injunction which may
have little, if any, effect by the time it is obtained.40 At this stage the
damage may be irreparable.
Due to this broad scope for exploitation, a work may attain a value
beyond the contemplation of the employer or the employee. It is not
always the employer's activity which increases the value of a work. A
work may be exploited in a way foreseen by both the employer and the
employee but may attain greater popularity than anticipated. This can
occur when an employee is paid by an advertising firm for an advertise-
ment which he has created in the course of his employment. If the
advertisement subsequently becomes very popular and becomes
strongly associated with a particular product, it will then be altered
and repeated in many different forms. The advertising company will
reap the benefit from this additional exploitation even though the ad-
vertisement was originally intended for a specific project in a specific
form.
Changes in technology over the duration of copyright may also re-
sult in unexpected increases in a work's value. For example, making a
video-tape of a literary work such as an instruction manual may not
have been envisioned forty years ago when an employee created the
manual as part of his job. However, provided that the Act includes
40 Memorandum from Roy C. Sharp to The Writer's Union of Canada (April 1, 1977).
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video-tapes, the employer would own the video-tape right even though
he obtained the subsidiary rights in the instruction manual prior to the
advent of the video-tape.4 1 Employees feel that such uncontemplated
uses and increased values of works are windfall gains to their employ-
ers and the monetary increase in the value of these works should be
shared with the employees. 2
The fourth concern of employer ownership is that of employers not
exercising the exploitive rights in works of employees. Non-exploitation
of work is an important issue to employees since they do not benefit
merely from the monetary gains, but rely on a certain measure of good-
will being generated from the exploitation of their work. This goodwill
may be in the guise of publicity which might lead to future jobs.
There are several reasons why an employer may choose not to ex-
ploit a work. For instance, it may be an inappropriate time to market
that work. If he is already marketing a work of a similar type a second
work may create unnecessary competition and reduce profit margins.43
As well, the employer may dislike a finished product and decide not to
publish it. It is also possible that prior to the publication of a work, the
employer goes bankrupt and thus is incapable of exploiting the work.
Unless some right has been reserved by contract, an employee does not
have the right to exploit the work if it is owned by his employer. Many
companies, especially advertising agencies, do not warehouse or file
unexploited works, so such employers would experience little hardship
if the copyright were to revert back to the employee."
In summary, the expressed inadequacies in the present law are the
following: the use of the unclear phrases "contract of service" and
"course of employment"; the policy and uncertainty regarding the
rights of a journalist's employer; the extent of an employer's rights to
the uncontemplated exploitation of a work; and the non-exercise of ex-
ploitative rights.
41 The Sub-Committee Report recommends a category of "audio-visual works" with a defini-
tion which will undoubtably include video-tapes, supra note 5 at 36-7 & recommendations 45 &
46. For discussion on protection of video-tapes under the present law see: L.E. Harris, "The May
White Paper: Proposed Copyright Changes Favour Film Industry" Cinema Canada (October
1984) at 27; and R.M. Perry, "Copyright in Motion Pictures & Other Mechanical Contrivance"
(1971) 3 Can. Com. L. Rev.
42 Supra note 4 at 114-15.
43 Ibid. at 115.
" Minutes of Procedures & Evidence of the Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on
Communications & Culture, First Session, 33rd Parliament, 1984-85, 14:15, per Mr. K.B. Ker-
racher, President, Institute of Canadian Advertising.
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IV. ALTERNATIVES
The first portion of this paper dealt with the conflict between em-
ployer's and employee's rights involving works created in the course of
employment and the unsatisfactory practicalities in the present law.
This part of the paper will examine possible solutions to both these
problems by presenting alternatives to the present law and suggesting
the best method of balancing employer and employee rights with mini-
mal applicational and interpretational implications.
Any alternatives to the present law must be within the spirit of
Canadian copyright law and must comply with Canada's international
copyright obligations. Before examining the options there will be a re-
view of the aims and restrictions of copyright law.
Canada belongs to two international copyright conventions: the
Berne Convention (1886) 45 and the Universal Copyright Convention
(1952) .46 Most industrial countries belong to one or both of these con-
ventions. Both conventions have had several enactments, the most re-
cent of each being in 1971 in Paris. Not every country who is a party
has ratified each enactment of the conventions, and therefore member
countries belong to different levels and have different obligations. This
is primarily because of unsatisfactory domestic legislation and a reluc-
tance to give greater protection to foreign authors than to their own
authors. Canada adheres to the Rome Act, 1928 of the Berne Conven-
tion, and to the 1952 text of the U.C.C. and its administrative provi-
sions in the Stockholm Act, 1967.
Both international conventions operate on the principle of national
treatment. This principle bestows nationals of member states copyright
protection in other convention countries according to their domestic
law. The enjoyment of convention protection is not precluded by the
existence of similar protection in the claimant's country of origin, or to
reciprocity.
Relying to a great degree upon domestic legislation in member
countries, both conventions only outline minimum protection in refer-
ence to certain works and circumstances. For instance, neither conven-
tion defines "author" nor do they provide for the determination of own-
ership of copyright works. Interpretations of ownership may be
extrapolated, however, from other provisions in the conventions. Article
1 of the Berne Convention provides that "the countries to which this
" Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
4" Hereinafter the U.C.C.
47 Differences between the level of the conventions to which Canada adheres and the most
recent enactments are irrelevant for the purposes of this discussion.
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Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of
authors in their literary and artistic works." Article 4(1) uses the word-
ing "[a]uthors . . . shall enjoy . . . the rights . . ." These and other
sections may be construed to mean that the author should enjoy the
rights in his works. Provisions that vest copyright initially in persons
other than the authors may not be observing the convention obliga-
tions.48 This idea is reflected in some countries by an absence of em-
ployment related works provisions in their legislation. On the other
hand, many convention countries allow for employer ownership and
there have been no official complaints that employer ownership is
against international obligations. 49 The Whitford Committee affirms
that although "the repeal of particular provisions touching first owner-
ship of employee's works and commissioned works is attractive and un-
doubtedly consistent with the [Berne] Convention, 850 it has never been
suggested that "in enacting such provision there has been a failure to
observe the Convention obligations."51
The reasoning above is also applicable to the Universal Copyright
Convention. Article I of the U.C.C. provides for "the protection of the
rights of authors and other copyright proprietors" in specified works.
There is no definition of "author" or "other copyright proprietors" in
the convention. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the phrase "and other
copyright proprietors" seems to accommodate more persons that those
referred to by the term "authors" in the Berne Convention. Several
explanations are offered as to why the expression "and other copyright
proprietors" is used. First, it attempts to close the gap between the
droit d'auteur philosophy which recognizes that only an individual may
be an author and the Anglo-Saxon philosophy which recognizes corpo-
rate copyright proprietors. Since it is up to the jurisdiction applying the
law to define "author" according to its domestic legislation it is not
encumbent upon the U.C.C. to bridge the gap between the two philoso-
phies. Second, the phrase extends protection to successors in title of the
author, either as assignees or as heirs. The Berne Convention provides
similar protection in Article 2(6) where it says that the "protection
48 Supra note 7 at 275. Phillips points out the fundamental copyright principle contained in
the Berne Convention as adopted by Dr. Dietz:". . . the author should be recognized in all eases
as the author of this work, and that therefore in him alone should copyright initially vest." This is
supported by B. Torno, Ownership of Copyright in Canada (1981) at 38.
49 For example, in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the em-
ployer is the copyright owner in the case of work made for hire: "Study of Comparative Copyright
Law: Persons Protected" (1977) 11 Copyright Bulletin at 15-16.
" Report of the Committee to Consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (Whitford Com-
mittee) (Cmnd. 6732, 1977) at 144, para. 570.
51 Ibid. at 139, para. 549.
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shall operate for the benefit of the author and his successors in title."
The inclusion of the phrase "and other copyright proprietors" in the
U.C.C. grants similar rights to those allotted by the Berne
Convention.
5 2
Since the two conventions do not explicitly define initial ownership
and do not deal with authors working under employment contracts (or
with commissioned works), member countries may decide according to
their domestic law in whom copyright of a specific work initially vests.
Canada's domestic law, unlike some countries, does not restrict
ownership to the creator of a work. In other nations such as the Federal
Republic of Germany, Belgium and Denmark, an author is always enti-
tled to first ownership of a copyright work since he has created it; copy-
right in these countries is based upon the natural property theory. Ca-
nadian copyright law does not follow this theory but is based upon
statutory copyright. The Copyright Act provides that no person is enti-
tled to copyright except in accordance with the provisions of the Act.53
These two approaches to ownership share the underlying principle that
an individual who creates a work owns the copyright in that work.54
Under statutory copyright, however, this may be subject to exceptions.
The question remains whether granting employers copyright is
against the underlying principle of copyright law. One view advanced is
that copyright does not protect the author of a work, but rather it pro-
tects the publisher (or any exploiter).5 5 This belief is based on the rea-
soning that in order for the author to gain any benefit from a work it
must be exploited, and this is only possible through assigning the rights
in that work to a publisher. Copyright, therefore, ultimately vests in the
publisher.5
Another opinion is that copyright is a right to which a given work
is subject.57 According to Professor L.R. Patterson's view, copyright is
a right to the exclusive publication of a work - the ultimate source of
this right being the author. His theory is confirmed by section 3 of the
Canadian Act which lists all the rights attaching to a copyright work
52 S.M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (1983) at 138, para.
6.04.
t" S.45; Canadian Admiral v. Rediffusion Inc. (1954), 14 Fox Pat. C. 114 at 122.
54 Supra note 3 at 69 states that "the underlying principle (in Canadian copyright law) is
that he who creates a work owns the copyright in that work".
11 S.G. Breyer, "Copyright in Books" (1970) 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281.
16 Ibid. Note that Breyer feels that protecting publishers is not justification for granting
copyright protection.
57 L.R. Patterson, "The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued" (1965) 2 Harv. J. Legis-
lation 223.
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without attaching them to an individual. Section 4 corroborates this by
outlining the conditions for obtaining copyright and, without referring
to rights in a specific person, mentions works in which copyright may
subsist.
Rights ascribed to a work must eventually attach to a person since
a work is incapable of benefitting from these rights. Professor Patter-
son's theory posits that the benefit of copyright should accrue to the
person or persons responsible for the source of the right and to the
person with the right to exclusive publication of a work. Even though
the author may be the "source" of the work and may possess the exclu-
sive rights to it, the author often voluntarily assigns these exclusive
rights to another person. In fact, the Act permits such assignments.58
The assignee of the copyright is entitled to all the rights which copy-
right grants, subject to any agreed upon limitation. Therefore in many
cases copyright will not only protect the author, but also protects the
exploiter of a work. Applying this concept to employment creations,
granting employers copyright in prescribed situations is not inconsistent
with the underlying principle of copyright since copyright not only pro-
tects those who create works, but also protects those, such as employ-
ers, who possess the exploitive rights in a work.
V. RETAINING EMPLOYER OWNERSHIP
Since employer copyright is arguably not against any of Canada's
international copyright obligations nor inconsistent with the aim of
Canada's copyright legislation, employer copyright may endure as an
exception to the general rule of ownership. Legislation could be modi-
fied to accommodate problems of application. It has been proposed that
Canadian copyright law retain the principle that the employer be the
first owner of the copyright of works made by his employee in the
course of employment. 59
Cuvillier contends that granting employers ownership of employ-
ees' works actually preserves the integrity of the Copyright Act in its
application to "true" artists.60 He maintains that creations arising out
" Section 12(4) of the Copyright Act provides for the assignment of copyright by the owner
either wholly or partially, and either generally or subject to territorial limitations, and either for
the whole term of the copyright or for any other part thereof.
9 Employer ownership was recommended in: Isley Commission, supra note 2 at 46; Keyes
and Brunet, supra note 3 at 71. Note that out of 22 responses to Keyes and Brunet's recommenda-
tion of employer ownership, 12 responses were in favour of the recommendation: Digest of Com-
ments Contained in Briefs Submitted in Response to: "'Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a
Revision of the Law" (1979) (draft copy) at 11-12; Sub-Committee Report, supra note 5 at 13-14
& recommendation 15.
60 R. Cuvillier, "Employment and Copyright" (1979) Copyright 112 at 117.
[VOL. 23 No. 2
Ownership of Employment Creations
of employment are generally of the minor or utilitarian arts which do
not require a high degree of originality. These may include listings of
streets, catalogues, yearbooks, and business letters. Not according
copyright to the creators of these works benefits artists by vesting copy-
right only in creators whose works are truly creative. He states that
employees should not expect to derive any noteworthy profit from such
works since they are not "true" works of art. He also makes reference
to a disinterest on the part of employees in claiming rights in employ-
ment creations, although he senses a growing interest. This allegation
of increased interest is not supported by the Sub-Committee Report
which concluded that very few salaried creators protested employer
ownership.61
Cuvillier's reasoning is based on the assumption that copyright
protects only original true art which is never produced within an em-
ployment situation. Yet copyright was never intended to protect the
limited subject matter to which the term "true art" refers. For exam-
ple, the definition "literary works"6 2 includes maps, charts, plans, ta-
bles and compilations. Case law has extended this definition to works
which do not have literary quality such as business correspondence.6 3
Second, the threshold of originality necessary for a copyright work is
very low, albeit dependent on the nature of the work; fundamentally
the creation cannot be copied from another work. 4 Third, employment
creations are not always "minor" works.6 5 A major painting, for exam-
ple, may belong to an employer if the necessary preconditions are satis-
fied. Work produced in advertising agencies or motion picture studios
may not be "minor" works. Furthermore, the integrity of the Copyright
Act in its application to "true" artists would not be preserved since
creators could still own copyright in "minor" works. To illustrate, a
person not under an employment contract who writes a letter retains
copyright in that letter despite it being of the "minor" arts.
Cuvillier also believes that an employment provision is necessary
for certain works such as motion pictures which are made by a group
of authors, screenwriters, actors, cinematographers, costume and set
" Supra note 5 at 13.
'2 Copyright Act, s.2.
03 British Oxygen Co., Ltd. v. Liquid Air, Ltd., [1925] Ch. 383.
04 Supra note 27.
10 The present employment provision is not limited to "minor" works and a distinction be-
tween "major" and "minor" works does not follow from the definition of many of the works pro-
tected by copyright. For example, the present law will protect a "minor" work such as a chart in
the same manner as it will protect a "major" work such as a piece of literature, both being
"literary works" under the Act.
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designers, and technical and artistic assistants. With respect to such
collaborative works, he thinks that it would be too costly and adminis-
tratively difficult to evaluate each person's contribution and to pay him
commensurate royalties as if he were an owner. It would also be oner-
ous to obtain permission from each author in order to institute an in-
fringement action.
Although it may be necessary for someone other than the creator,
namely the producer or production company, to have copyright in a
film, an employer ownership provision cannot be justified in all in-
stances of employment creations. Since films are not always made by
employees, but by independent and freelance contractors, an employer
ownership provision may not even result in all films vesting in the pro-
ducer or production company. For example, the right to adapt a book
into a film may be obtained after the literary work is completed. In
such a case, the author of the book would not be considered an em-
ployee. Therefore, in lieu of an employement provision applying to cine-
matographic works, an explicit provision codifying the current law and
vesting the ownership of films with the producer or production com-
pany should be included in the Copyright Act.
6
Another factor favouring employer ownership is that there are a
greater number of employees who create copyright works as part of
their job than there are persons who create copyright works outside of
an employment context.6 7 Most jobs include the creation of some copy-
right works, be it a photograph or an internal memorandum. Without
an employer ownership provision there would be a spate of contracts
and collective agreements incorporating clauses granting ownership to
employers. 8 Yet the predicted increase of "new" contracts is question-
able. Managerial-type employees generally have written employment
contracts and the same applies to any person employed for a term
longer than one year.69 Before an action can be initiated under the vari-
ous Canadian Statutes of Frauds,70 contracts lasting more than one
year must be in writing, or at the very least, there must be some memo-
randum or note containing the material terms of the agreement. The
necessity of contracts in an employment-related copyright situation
" This was recommended in the White Paper, supra note 4 at 30.
'7 This was expressed by Terry Westway on behalf of the Newsletter Association at a Board
of Governors Meeting of the Canadian Copyright Institute (Aug. 22, 1984).
s Keyes & Brunet, supra note 3 at 69; Sub-Committee Report, supra note 5 at 14.
" H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Canada (1981) at 66.
" The Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1970, c.444; Statute of Frauds, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 2-14;
Statute of Frauds, R.S.N.S. 1967 c. 290 were cited as examples by Arthurs, ibid. at 69,
footnote 1.
[VOL. 23 NO. 2
Ownership of Employment Creations
would therefore apply only to support staff and to those who work for
less than one year. Because the number of employees requiring con-
tracts is limited to those in the above circumstances, the argument that
there would be a "spate of contracts" is not tenable.
An argument in favour of employer ownership is that the two
countries with which Canada does its greatest trade have such provi-
sions. Administrative difficulties may arise if Canada's employment
provision differed substantially from the ones in the United States and
the United Kingdom. To illustrate, a American parent corporation may
be responsible for creating certain bulletins and reports, whereas its
Canadian subsidiary is responsible for creating other works which are
reciprocally distributed. If contractual arrangements were necessary for
employees of the Canadian subsidiary with respect to their creations
whereas equivalent procedures are not necessary in the United States,
there may be increased administrative costs which may be passed indi-
rectly to the Canadian consumer. 1
Moreover, if employers were assigned rights by authors, such as-
signments would be subject to a statutory reversion of the copyright
twenty-five years after the author's death. This reversion might be ir-
relevant with respect to a memorandum written during the course of
employment, but it might have a detrimental effect where a work was
published and is still valuable and being exploited by the employer at
the time the reversionary interest sets in.
A further justification for the retention of an employer ownership
provision is the basic argument underlying the present policy of the
employer provision which is to reward the risk-taker. If retained, how-
ever, the employer ownership provision should be in a modified form
which takes into account the inadequacies discussed in the first part of
this essay.
In order to counteract the serious negative problems of employer
ownership, a change to the wording of the section is required - specifi-
cally, the elimination of the expression "contract of service. ' 72 This ex-
pression is ambiguous and results in uncertainties, and it is "only intel-
ligible, if at all, to lawyers." 73 This provision merely adds to the
difficulty employers experience in establishing when the law actually
11 A Brief Concerning A White Paper on Copyright Revision "From Gutenberg to Telidon",
submitted by the Joint Copyright Legislation Committee on behalf of the Patent and Trademark
Institute of Canada and the Canadian Bar Association to the Sub-Committee of the Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture on the Revision of Copyright (1985) at 21-22.
72 Whitford Committee, supra note 50 at 140, para. 557. For Sub-Committee Report's rec-
ommendations, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
73 Whitford Committee, ibid. at 143, para. 568.
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applies to them.
In re-phrasing the employment provision, one must determine the
type of employment situations it should cover. A new Act need not
merely reiterate the term "contract of service" for a more articulate
phrase but could expand the provision to encompass other employment
situations, including those where a commission is paid or a retainer
obtained. Employer ownership need not omit independent contractors.
Whether a creator is under a contract of service or is a freelancer, he is
being paid for the copyright works produced. Newspapers regularly
employ freelance writers, photographers and artists to work, under edi-
torial control, on particular projects where creation takes place due
only to publishers' direction. 74 Based on the policy that the payor is
entitled to the copyright, the employer should own the copyright in
these works in the above situations.7"
This payor-as-owner policy is recognized in patent law (although
not by statute in Canadian patent law). Any patentable invention
made for hire belongs to the hirer, unless the invention is not related to
the business. If such a broad definition were to replace the present em-
ployer provision, there would still be a problem of formulating the suit-
able statutory language. This was attempted in the United Kingdom
Patents Act 1977. Section 39 of the Act sets out that, where there is no
contract of employment, employers are entitled to inventions made in
the course of their employee's normal duties or his specifically assigned
duties, as long as an invention might reasonably be expected from car-
rying them out. The employer is also entitled to the invention where the
employee has a special obligation to further the interests of the em-
ployer's undertaking due to the particular responsibilities arising from
the nature of his duties. Section 2 of the Act deals with the enforceabil-
ity of contracts relating to employee's inventions and states that any
contractual provisions which limit the inventor's statutory rights are
unenforceable to the extent of the purported limitation. Other sections
address the statutory right to compensation in prescribed circum-
stances77 and supply a calculation for such compensation.78
7 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee
on Communications and Culture, First Session, 33rd Parliament, 1984-85, 14:23, per M. Burt,
Chairman, Copyright Committee, Canadian Daily Newspaper Publishers Association.
7 See Sub-Committee Report, supra note 5. Retaining "contracting of service" and defining
"employee" as recommended would generally amount to the same result as this paper's
recommendations.
7' For a general discussion of ownership of employment inventions, see H.G. Fox, Canadian
Patent Law (1969) 230-243.
77 U.K. Patent Act 1977, s.40.
70 U.K. Patent Act 1977. s.41.
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Section 39 of the Patents Act 1977 is not without its interpretational
problems. For instance, are an employee's "normal duties" those nor-
mally performed by the employee or those stipulated as his contractual
duties?7 9 Furthermore, who might reasonably expect an invention to
result from the performance of one's duties: the employer, the em-
ployee, or is this reasonably judged from the viewpoint of an unrelated
person? 80 These are just predictions of the problems that will be en-
countered since the Patents Act 1977 has not yet been applied because
of the overlapping jurisdiction of the United Kingdom Patents Act
1949.81 Since such a comprehensive definition may have the same or
more ambiguities than the present copyright law, such a definition with
respect to ownership of employment creations is not recommended.
The Whitford Committee suggests that a relatively clear provision
is one in which works are defined solely by reference to those "made in
the course of employment."82 This recommendation might also lead to
more ambiguities than the present provision because it is so broad that
it would cover all works made for hire, even those unrelated to the
business. It is proposed that the provision be limited to "works .created
in the ordinary course of business within the ordinary duties of the em-
ployee." Although not ideal wording, since what is intended by "ordi-
nary course of business" and "ordinary duties of the employee" re-
mains unclear, no language would be perfectly clear in all situations.
This phrase would at least address the concerns of the Whitford Com-
mittee recommendation by embracing all types of employment instead
of only those with a contract of service and would clarify when an em-
ployee can be designated as such under the section.
It has been suggested that the word "apprenticeship" be removed
from the provision 3 since it has not been the subject of any litigation
and it could be covered under a more general formulation of an em-
ployment section.
Another major change to an employer ownership provision could
be a restriction of the rights which the employer acquires. Recall that
the employer does not simply obtain the right to reproduce an em-
70 B. Bercusson, The Contract of Employment and Contracting Out of the U.K. Patents Act
1977 (1980) EIPR 257 at 257.
80 Dr. J. Phillips, Employees' Inventions in the United Kingdom (1982) at 53.
81 The U.K. Patents Act 1949 continues to govern disputes regarding patents granted for
inventions made before June 1, 1978. Patents for these inventions will not all have expired until
the late 1990's, which means that the Patents Act 1949 will remain in force for some time: Ibid.
at 7.
82 Supra note 50 at 143, para. 566; at 145-6, para. 575.
83 Ibid. at 145-6, para. 575; Canadian Copyright Institute, Submission by the C.C.L Anent
Copyright Proposals for Revision of the Law at 13.
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ployee's work, but is entitled to all subsidiary rights connected to that
work. There have been no complaints against the employer's enjoyment
of these rights, but there have been many complaints by employees
that, through these subsidiary rights, employers have enjoyed the work
of employees beyond the contemplation of either party. The complaint
may arise when a work attains a value beyond the expectation of either
the employer or the employee. Employees feel that they should share
the benefits of such unexpected windfalls.8a
Employers counter this proposal by asserting that if employees
share windfall gains, they should also share losses. When employers
pay for the creation of a work, they cannot predict the specific amount
of money a work will generate. Employers incur the risk of the work
being successful. They undertake this risk not merely by paying for the
creation of the work but by investing in promotions and marketing.
Employees do not take this risk; regardless of a work's success, they are
paid for its creation. Employers are thus deserving of extra gains due to
the losses they must absorb from unsuccessful works. If employees were
willing to risk a loss, they would be entitled to the windfall gains.
Employers also submit that sharing unexpected returns is similar
to granting a droit de suite to employees. A droit de suite enables the
creator of a work, usually of an original artistic work, to share the pro-
ceeds of its resale. By this right, an artist may claim a share in an
increased value of a work of art when it is resold. Since there is no
droit de suite in the present law, nor is one recommended in Canada, 85
employers may argue that any similar right should also be avoided.
Employers maintain that employees benefit indirectly from unexpected
windfalls; employees gain from goodwill attached to well-known works
and may procure subsequent fame or remuneration from being associ-
ated with such works.
If an employer's rights are not limited, exploitation of the em-
ployee's work will be totally dependent on the employer's efforts and
the employee will acquire no rights at all.86 This dependency has led to
suggestions to limit the extent of employers rights. Some countries have
gone beyond recommendations and have drafted such a provision. West
German copyright law limits the employer's rights (or those of any per-
son other than the creator) to the purpose envisaged when the copy-
" Supra note 4 at 114-115.
s5 Ibid. at 22; Sub-Committee Report, supra note 5 at 28-29 & recommendation 35.
11 E.K. Pakuscher, "Recent Trends of the German Copyright Law" (1975), Vol. 23, No. 2
Bulletin of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 65 at 68.
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right in the work was granted to the employer (or the other person). 87
Note that West German copyright law contains no special sections re-
garding employment creations and therefore this section is applicable
to all persons to whom a license in the copyright is granted. Canadian
copyright law already includes such a right in sub-section 12(3), that of
the special regime enjoyed by journalists. It is important to realize that
the journalist's right is merely to prevent publication and does not give
a positive right of publication, as this would be an infringement of the
copyright vested in the employer.88
This limited right of the employee journalist to prevention need
not deter him from writing another article based on the original one
which is now owned by his employer. This is because copyright does
not protect ideas. As any other person, a journalist could write a simi-
lar article on the same subject utilizing the same ideas. But a person
writing this article might be infringing the copyright of the original
article if he conceives the ideas himself but relies on the information in
the first article and does not personally seek out the common source of
the ideas.8 9 A journalist who wrote the article initially could claim that
he is not relying on the ideas of the original article, but is relying on
the sources from whence these ideas originated. Also, infringement only
occurs where there has been a substantial appropriation of both the
quality and quantity of a work.90 A journalist may use portions of his
original article in another publication provided that the portions used
are not the essence of the original article (even if it is only one sen-
tence) and as long as a large quantity of the original article is not re-
produced. Where infringement is alleged, the court may also examine
whether the new article will interfere with the exploitation of the origi-
nal work. 1 Even though the journalist is free to use portions of his
article he must be very careful in doing so, since there is no standard
upon which he may rely. The amount taken is always a question of fact
for the court to find.
There is no reason why a restriction on the exploitation of works in
Canadian copyright law should only apply to works by journalists.
Such a restriction should either apply to all employment creations or to
none. The Ilsley Commission in 1957 recommended that there be no
87 Federal Republic of Germany Copyright Act, 31(5). This is called the purpose of grant
theory.
88 Sun Newspapers Ltd. v. Whippie (1928), 28 S.R. (N.S.W.) 473.
:9 Collins v. Rosenthal (1974), 14 C.P.R. (2d) 143.
0 Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football), Ltd. (1964), 1 W.L.R. 273.
91 Warner Bros. v. A.M. Broadcasting Cos. (1981) as referred to by W.J. Braithwaite, Intel-
lectual Property (1983-84) at 417.
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exceptions for journalists as it is unjustifiably discriminatory to confer
a privileged status to some employees in one kind of business (periodi-
cals), and not to employees in another kind of business.92 In the United
Kingdom, the Whitford Committee in 197713 and the Green Paper in
198194 both proposed that the protection of the journalist employee be
extended to all employees. Without this limitation presently enjoyed by
journalists, employers would be the sole profit-makers when works
originating as newspaper articles are adapted to different medias and
formats and become best-sellers and big revenue makers. To illustrate,
"The Best Little Whorehouse in Texas" began as a magazine article,
and later became a Broadway show followed by a film.9 5
Of all the recommendations made in Canada regarding copyright
revision, none have been made to limit the extent of an employer's use
of a work. Nevertheless, the White Paper did present the argument
that an employee should be permitted to negotiate the variety of ways
in which different works can be exploited. It was also noted, however,
that negotiating each use may cause other problems beyond unneces-
sary paperwork and expense. This is true where the employment con-
tract has terminated, the employee's whereabouts are unknown, and
the employer requires permission.9 6 There are many ways of satisfying
the concerns of the employee but these might contradict the employer's
rights granted to him for the risks taken. One possibility would be an
employment provision that restricts the exploitation of the work by the
employer to ways contemplated by both parties at the time the work
was completed. Another way would be to require the consent of the
creator where there is exploitation by someone other than the em-
ployer. 17 Consent by the creator would ensure that a third party is not
using the work in a manner beyond its ordinary uses or in a way uncon-
templated at the time of creation of the work.
Finally, a right of revocation would fall under this category. West
German copyright law provides a right of revocation in two circum-
stances: (1) by reason of non-exercise 98 and (2) by reason of changed
92 Supra note 2 at 46.
" Supra note 50 at 154, para. 609.
Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection: A Con-
sultative Document (Green Paper) (Cmnd. 8302, 1981) para. 10.13 as referred to by Dr. . Phil-
lips, "Copyright Ownership and Law Reform in the United Kingdom" (1982) 4 EIPR I I 1 at 113,
footnote 40.
95 Supra note 74 at 28 per Brunet.
"' Supra note 4 at 115.
The Japanese Copyright (Law No. 48 of 1970) Art. 63(3) provides that the right of ex-
ploitation cannot be transferred without the consent of the copyright owner.
98 Federal Republic of Germany Copyright Act, 41. See Canadian Copyright Act, supra note
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conviction.99 Revocation by non-exercise of a right occurs when rights
are not exercised or not adequately exercised, and where the author
cannot be expected to remedy the serious injury caused to his lawful
interests. The general limitation on exercising this right is two years
from delivery of the work. Shorter periods are allocated for newspaper
pieces (three months), monthly publications or less (six months) and
other periodicals (one year). The author must first notify the licensee of
a given work and concede a reasonable period of time for exploitation.
No extension is necessary if exploitation is impossible, there is a refusal
to exercise the right, or if an extension would endanger the author's
primary interests. Revocation by reason of changed conviction arises
where the work no longer reflects the author's views and he can no
longer be expected to agree to the exploitation of the work. Neither
type of revocation can be waived in advance. Since the licence expires
upon revocation the author must, where necessary, indemnify the
licensee.
Any of the above mentioned statutory provisions may harshly limit
employers' rights, besides being difficult to implement. For example,
there may be no contemplated modes of exploitation at the time a work
is created and neither party may anticipate a specific profit from a par-
ticular work. Even if anticipated, it would be hard to determine at what
point a work gained unexpected value, and difficult to set up a statu-
tory scheme whereby each party obtained their share. Also, the policy
of these limiting provisions, being that the employee shares in the prof-
its of his creation, can be effectively remedied outside the statute. To
illustrate, employees often get bonuses for creating valuable works and
possibly a share in the business through partnership. Without these ex-
isting practices, employees would have little incentive to create valuable
works and would either not do so or would change jobs. Statutory pro-
visions limiting employers' rights and enforcing certain demands on
them may stifle the perks and goodwill employees receive from high
income-potential creations.
In summary, it is recommended that if employer ownership is re-
tained, it should be modified to apply to works created in the ordinary
course of business within the ordinary duties of the employee.
VI. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP
If copyright were granted to the employee, it would also be subject
I s. 13.
'2 Federal Republic of Germany Copyright Act, 42.
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to an agreement to the contrary. This would enable an employer to
obtain copyright in a creator's work in the same manner as could any
other person who was not the creator of the work, that is, by assign-
ment of the copyright. There need not be any special provision to this
effect. Subject to the Act, employees would fall under the general rule
of author ownership in sub-section 12(1). It would be necessary though
to replace the words in the subsection from "subject to the Act" to
"subject to an agreement to the contrary." To eliminate any additional
uncertainty, it is advisable to have a provision that explicitly states that
the author-as-payor provision encompasses employment creations.
Some believe that a provision of this sort has a "simplistic logical
appeal" and that it would result in a spate of contracts.100 But this may
be an exaggeration.101 Employers often give employees written employ-
ment contracts, 02 and a clause could be inserted in these contracts that
assigns the employer copyright in all works created in the performance
of one's duties. Such a clause would not necessarily lead to the expen-
sive consultation of lawyers. Employment contracts with clauses as-
signing copyright to employers would become standard and could be
purchased at office supply stores. A lawyer might be consulted initially,
after which all offers of employment from that employer would contain
one simple clause.1 03 Employers who are not in the habit of providing
employment contracts would not be overly taxed, since they could pre-
pare or obtain a standard one, which could be used with all employees.
As a result, employees hesitant to sign such contracts without their
lawyer's approval would be subject to novel expenses. Of course, a new
Act would need to carry over provisions from the old law since an em-
ployer could not suddenly lose copyright in employees' works and he
could not coerce employees to sign contracts, as force would render
them null and void.
Employers argue that acquiring copyright in an employee's work
would necessitate special arrangements on their part. Employers claim
that they hire employees to create particular works as part of their
duties and the salary paid to them is intended as compensation for the
work. If employers were required to pay an amount over and above a
regular salary in order to obtain copyright in the works, they assert
"00 Supra note 68 and accompanying text.
101 Literary Translators' Association, Brief on the Revision of the Copyright Law in Canada
(1978) at 7.
102 Supra note 69 and accompanying text.
'o' This was expressed by Fred Kerner on behalf of the Canadian Authors' Association. Min-
utes of a Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Canadian Copyright Institute (Sept. 25, 1984)
(hereinafter C.C.I.).
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that they would be paying twice for the same thing.1"4 This is not so
since employers receive not one, but two benefits from the employee
the tangible res and the exploitive rights in the work.
10 5
Despite complaints of hardship by employers, there may be advan-
tages in granting copyright to artists. First, it ensures that an author
who transfers copyright to his employer, and his employer, have full
knowledge of the extent of their perspective rights, provided that both
parties understand the arrangement. There would be greater assurance
of ownership of an employment creation if all rights were detailed in
the employment contract. The employer would be presumed the owner
and be less likely to be involved in a preliminary trial regarding the
ownership of the work, as long as there were no problems with the
contract. 106 An employer wishing to sue for infringement of an employ-
ment creation would thereby save time and money.
A contract avoids the statutory problem of resolving when an em-
ployment provision applies. Unless there was an agreement to the con-
trary, works would always initially belong to their creator. The distinc-
tion of whether an employee is under a contract of service or is an
independent contractor would no longer determine ownership of a
work. If an employee wanted to transfer copyright to his "employer,"
he could do so without explicitly defining the nature of the employment
relationship.
The utilization of an employment contract could also provide for
uncontemplated uses of a work, unexpected high values of a work, and
non-exploitation of a work. By leaving such rights to be concluded in
each contract, an employer would not be obligated to provide them. A
voluntary insertion is superior to an automatic grant as it acknowledges
the arguments employers assert against these rights.
In light of the possible benefits developing from employee owner-
ship, it is important to examine the hardships that this purported
change in the law may impose on employers and employees.
A transfer of copyright which is prescribed by contract would, in
an ideal world, afford a wide range of possibilities. A contract would be
advantageous to an employee in that he could limit the extent of his
employer's rights in his works. But the reality of an employee actually
achieving this goal through an employment contract is dubious. A man-
ager in a large corporation does not have much input into his employ-
'0 Supra note 4 at 114.
105 See, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
106 For instance, the parties were ad idem when the contract was entered into and it is not
unconscionable.
19851
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
ment contract, nor does an unknown neophyte copywriter in a major
advertising company. In both instances the employment contract is ba-
sically dictated by the employer, and "new" clauses involving uncon-
templated uses of a work would probably not appear. In view of the
absence of any such conditions in the present sixty-two year old em-
ployment provision, in all likelihood it would not be considered unfair
or unconscionable for an employer to ignore such terms. It is probable
that such terms would be left out of collective agreements, since clauses
for uncontemplated uses, for a share in the increased value or for non-
exploitation are foreign to Canadian copyright law. If such rights are
contingent upon being introduced into Canadian law through employ-
ment contracts, they might never come into existence since employers
are naturally reluctant to voluntarily limit their own rights.
Furthermore, an employer cannot be expected to have a different
contract for each employee. An employer would, at the most, have a
few different versions of standard contracts to cover a multitude of em-
ployees. This would have the unfortunate effect of restricting the bar-
gaining power of the employee with respect to the terms of the employ-
ment contract.
In effect, an employer would have similar rights to those he pos-
sesses under the present statutory scheme, except in two circumstances.
In the case of journalist employees, the employer's rights would in-
crease so that he would then be entitled to use a journalist's work as he
desired. Second, the duration of the employer's rights would be twenty-
five years after the author's death when the copyright would then re-
vert back to the author's estate, instead of the full term of fifty years
after the author's death.
If employer ownership were possible only via employment con-
tracts, employers would have the burden in measure of time, cost and
storage space of retaining written agreements to the contrary or assign-
ments for the life of the author plus fifty years. 107 These would have to
be preserved so that the title could be derived if the employer were
suing for infringement in that work, since he would initially have to
prove "his" ownership in the work.
The disadvantages to employers of employee ownership is made
manifest where a work is created by many authors. An architectural
firm engaged in designing a high-rise apartment building has to handle
the copyright works of specifications, site plans, sketch design plans,
working drawings, and detailed drawings.108 It would be quite onerous
107 Supra note 4 at 114.
108 Supra note 50 at 145, para. 572.
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for an architectural firm to efficiently retain a contract with each such
author for the life of the author and fifty years after his death for every
building designed. After several similar projects the office would be-
come a bureaucratic depot.
This same problem would not occur if there were automatic em-
ployer ownership in all employment creations. One might argue that
because the term of copyright is based on the life of the author, regard-
less of ownership, employers, no matter how they obtain ownership,
would always have to keep some records - that is, ones that follow the
life (and death) of the author in order to determine the fifty years after
the author's death when the copyright expires. This, however, is not a
substantial problem with respect to employment creations since they
are often literary works, such as letters or reports or advertisements,
which have a useful life span less than the duration of the copyright. In
addition, employer ownership could be determined by a department
manager vouching that a certain report, by the nature of the work, was
written by an employee in, for example, the last ten to fifteen years.
At this point it is interesting to note the difference between patent
and copyright law with respect to retaining records of employment. In
patent law there is no statutory rule regarding employment inventions,
yet there is also no obligation upon employers to retain extensive
records of inventors and works. The difference in the obligation to re-
tain records is due to the fact that patents are granted after a lengthy
application process, whereas copyright is automatic upon fixation
(though there is a voluntary registration system). 109 Where the owner-
ship of a patent is in dispute, the employer of an inventor could always
rely on the official documents in the filing office as prima facie proof of
ownership. Though not required to do so, an employer might keep his
own more complete records. These may include information such as the
date of first invention or the nature of the employee's duties.110 An em-
ployer of a creator could not rely on similar documentation unless he
had always made it a point to file. Even then, the documents used to
register a copyright are not nearly as explicit as those needed to regis-
ter a patent.
Additional problems may arise if, lacking an employment contract,
an employer were claiming copyright in his employee's work. An em-
ployer could argue before a court that although the maker of a work is,
109 Note that although the White Paper, supra note 4 at 73, recommends the abolishment of
the registration system and replacing its advantages through statutory presumptions favouring the
plaintiff, the Sub-Committee recommends its maintenance with increased information required
upon registration: Sub-Committee Report, supra note 5 at 93-96 & recommendations 127-131.
11' Supra note 80 at 92.
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in law, the owner of the copyright in the work, he must be deemed to
have granted his employer a licence or the prerogative to hold the copy-
right, or a part of it, in trust for his employer.111
While the doctrine of implied trusts is more familiar to patent law,
cases of licences have previously occurred in copyright, often with re-
spect to architectural plans. 12 An implied trust arises where, consistent
with good faith, it is proper to infer or imply that an inventor should be
deemed to hold his patent, or some interest in the patent, in trust for
another.113 The Whitford Committee submits that a similar doctrine
would apply in copyright law if there were disputes concerning legal
ownership, and that in such cases the courts would hold that employers
have a beneficial interest.11 4 Once a beneficial interest is established,
the employer would be entitled to have the legal title assigned to
him.11 5 To ensure greater certainty and justice, the Whitford Commit-
tee suggests that a reasonably clear 1 6 statutory employer ownership
provision is preferable rather than leaving rights to be defined by con-
tract because contracts will not be entered into in a great many in-
stances. 1 7 This may not reflect the Canadian labour situation where
many employers already use employment contracts.11 8
Thus far, it appears that author ownership would not increase em-
ployees' rights and would burden employers with the obligation of re-
taining employment contracts. After twenty-five years, employers
would still be subject to the reversion of their interest to the author's
estate. It is possible, nonetheless, that employee ownership could benefit
employees without harshly burdening employers. This could be
achieved through a compromised position of employee ownership. The
Canadian Copyright Institute recommends author copyright, subject to
an exclusive license by the employer to use the work created in the
Supra note 50 at 142, para. 566.
For example, see: Stovin-Bradford v. Volpoint Properties Ltd. (1971), 1 Ch. 1007; Blair
v. Osborne (1971), 2 W.L.R. 503; Neptusky v. Dominion Bridge (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 195. Note
that in a case of an assignment under s. 12(4) it was held that the assignment need not necessarily
be produced if the evidence establishes that it existed and conformed to that section: Motel 6, Inc.
v. No. 6 Motel Limited (1981), [1982] 1 F.C. 638 at 647-8.
"' Gage Ltd. v. Sugden (1967), 2 O.R. 151.
' Supra note 50 at 413, para. 566. Two practising lawyers support this view: Michael Mc-
Donald says that "the courts would support existing business practice" and Marion D. Hebb says
that "no court would prevent use by the employer of documents produced for specific purposes of
work": C.C.I., supra note 103.
" Massine v. De Basil (1937), [1936-45] Mac. Cop. Cas. 223.
"e Such a provision may be: "works made by employees in the course of employment:" supra
note 50 at 145, para. 575.
Supra note 50 at 143, para. 566; at 144, para. 570.
: See, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ordinary course of business, provided that the work has been created
within the ordinary duties of the employee. 1 9 A similar provision is
advanced in the White Paper as a possible alternative to the present
employment proviso.120 A version of this was also recommended in the
dissenting opinion of the Sub-Committee Report.121 It is suggested that
it be "subject to any agreement to the contrary" as would any employ-
ment provision, in order that the parties be. free to strike agreements
best suited to their particular circumstances. Note however that such a
provision only eases the employer hardship if the reversionary interest
as recommended is abolished.
Such a provision as suggested by the White Paper would bestow
upon an employer similar rights as he has under the present law; em-
ployment contracts would not be essential for all employment creations
since an employer would have an automatic right to his employees'
works in the prescribed circumstances. These circumstances may not
always be evident, but it is doubtful whether any provision, including
an employer ownership provision, could provide complete clarity in all
employer ownership situations.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Vesting ownership in the creator does not adequately address the
problems in the present law. Such a provision would neither diminish
the hardship which employees claim nor provide greater certainty with
respect to the ownership of employment creations. Under such a provi-
sion an employee would not be entitled to more rights than he currently
possesses. In fact, an employee journalist would not only lose his special
regime, but would also be unable to prevent his employer from exploit-
ing his work in any publication whatsoever. The employer would be
burdened with the extra task of providing employment contracts in or-
der to ensure his rights in works he caused to be produced, and would
be subject to the statutory reversionary interest.
On the other hand, a modified provision of the present employer
ownership provision could more clearly define those situations where
19 Canadian Copyright Institute, Brief to the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright
Re: White Paper on Copyright: "From Gutenberg to Telidon" (1985) at 10. This is similar to the
"shop right" under U.S. Patent Law where no legislation exists on the ownership of employment
inventions. The Common Law provides employee ownership subject to a shop right in favour of
the employer; a non-exclusive, non-assignable, royalty-free licence to use the invention for the
term of the patent grant where the employee has made an invention not related to his job, but has
done so in the employer's time and/or used his facilities: Neal Orkin, "Case Comment" [1982] 5
EIPR 149 at 149.
"2 Supra note 4 at 115.
221 See, supra note 5 at 99-100.
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employer ownership ought to exist. It could also eliminate the journal-
ist's special regime, without presenting employers with novel burdens.
Like an employee ownership provision, an employer ownership
provision would be consistent with the principles underlying Canadian
copyright legislation. There is some concern, however, that statutory
employer ownership violates Canada's international copyright commit-
ments. This concern is despite the absence of complaints against such a
provision, the sixty-two year existence of employer ownership in Can-
ada and employer ownership provisions in other convention countries.
The best manner in which to resolve this quandary so that employ-
ers and employees are assured the same rights as in an employer own-
ership provision is to subject employee ownership to an employer li-
cence to use the works created in the ordinary course of business within
the ordinary duties of the employee. However, if the reversionary inter-
est is not abolished, Canada may have to follow other convention coun-
tries who have employer ownership provisions, and once again risk vio-
lating the international conventions. In such a case, employers should
only be entitled to use the works created in the ordinary course of busi-
ness within the ordinary duties of the employee. Depending on the out-
come of Canada's new copyright laws with respect to the reversionary
interest, either one of the above provisions, subject to an agreement to
the contrary, would best address the issue of the ownership of copyright
of employment creations while taking into account the policy and prac-
tical implications resulting from its application.
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